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I. INTRODUCTION

A fundamental issue that often serves to frame the debate regarding
matters of international trade pertains to the conceptual difference that
separates "fair trade" and "free trade." "Fair traders" articulate the belief
that societal goals and concerns must be addressed at the same time as the
economic issues of trade are negotiated between sovereign nations; these
social goals include concern for the environment, human rights, and fair
and humane labor standards. 2 "Free traders," on the other hand, do not
recommend such targeted efforts, but instead counsel reliance upon the
natural economic consequences of a free marketplace, hoping that it will
"lift all boats." 3 The United States will often (at least when Democrats are
* J.D. 1979, L.L.M. 2004, Albany Law School. Mr. Armstrong is a principal attorney at
Pattison, Sampson, Ginsberg & Griffin, P.C., Troy, New York, a law firm providing legal services
to colleges and universities including Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute. The author wishes to thank
Professor James Gathii of Albany Law School for his contributions to this Article.
1. See generally JOHN A. HOBSON, IMPERIALISM: A STuDY (George Allen ed., Unwin Ltd.
1938) (1902); see also Alicia Morris Groos, InternationalTrade andDevelopment: Exploringthe
Impact of FairTrade Organizationsin the Global Economy and the Law, 34 TEx. INT'L. L.J. 379,

387 (1999).
2. Groos, supranote 1, at 380-81, 387.
3. DAVID RICARDO, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION 81 (J.M. Dent

& Sons Ltd. 1965) (1911).
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in power) profess "fair trade" goals and will, during the course of trade
negotiations, press such concerns, particularly regarding labor issues. It
has occasionally even insisted on "side agreements" designed not only to
protect home labor markets, but ostensibly to protect foreign workers from
the economic excesses of predatory employers in their own country, or
even from the indifference of their own national government.4 As a recent
example of this position, before President Clinton agreed to sign the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), he insisted upon the
negotiation and execution of a "side agreement" designed to address
worker's rights; this agreement is known as the North American
Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC).5
The holding in the remarkable (and surprisingly unnoticed) case of
Estados Unidos Mexicanos v. DeCoster,6 may seem, in many ways, to
serve as an ironic twist on these efforts by the United States. In that case,
the tables were perfectly turned. There, not the United States but a foreign
government was attempting to intervene within the U.S. court system to
register and enforce complaints about how both foreign and domestic
workers of Mexican origin were being treated by a U.S. company, and
indirectly by the United States itself, in its presumed lax enforcement of
existing labor and civil rights laws. In an even more perfect irony, the
United States turned back such a request, holding in essence that Mexico
had no place to assert such an argument in U.S. courts.
Part II of this Article will examine the facts and holdings of DeCoster
and place that case within the general framework ofjurisdictional issues
concerning the rights and obligations of foreign nations to sue in U.S.
courts.
Part III will review and critically analyze the arguments both in favor
of and against standing, including the questions ofwhether prior precedent
should have compelled a holding that standing should have ensued. It will
also review policy considerations that various commentators have
4. Clyde Summers, The Battle in Seattle: FreeTrade,LaborRights andSocietal Values, 22
U. PA. J. INT'L. ECON. L. 61,63-64 (2001). "Tying free trade to the recognition ofbasic labor rights
has [in fact been a long] articulated policy of the United States [and was] reflected in the General
System of Preferences of 1971, the Caribbean Basin Recovery Act of 1983, and the Overseas
Investment Corporation Amendment of 1985 in which trade benefits were given on the countries'
recognition of minimum labor standards." Id.
5. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1499
[hereinafter NAALC], availableat http://www.naalc.org/english/agreement.shtml (last visited Mar.
9, 2004).
6. 229 F.3d 332, 341 (lst Cir. 2000).
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advanced in support of foreign nation parenspatriae standing. 7 Part IV
will describe the NAALC and its enforcement mechanisms and consider
whether it is (or should be) the exclusive mechanism for a foreign country
to address labor matters which pertain to activities which occur within the
borders of another country. The conclusion will offer some final thoughts
on this remarkable topic.
II. DECOSTER IN THE CONTEXT OF FOREIGN COUNTRY STANDING

It is well settled that, at least for certain purposes, a foreign government
will be permitted to commence a lawsuit in U.S. courts. There is a long
line of U.S. precedent, dating back to the nineteenth century, which
permits standing; these cases typically involved claims of a proprietary or
economic nature, rather than of a type which asserted political or
governmental interests of a foreign country. So held the U.S. Supreme
Court in the landmark case of The Sapphire,9 where the Court determined
that a foreign sovereign (as well as any other foreign citizen) which had a
demand of civil nature could prosecute it in U.S. courts.' The Court held
that to deny such a privilege would "manifest a want of comity and
friendly feeling."'" To the same effect is the 1964 case of Banco National
du Cuba v. Sabbatino,2 where the U.S. Supreme Court held that a bank
controlled by the government of Cuba had standing to sue for conversion
of bills of lading. 3 Such a holding ensued even though Cuba was, in the
words of the Court, an "unfriendly power" which did not permit a U.S.
national to obtain similar relief in Cuban courts. 14 More recently, in the
1978 case of Pfizer,Inc. v. India,the U.S. Supreme Court permitted India,
Iran, Vietnam and the Philippines, as the purchasers of antibiotics, to sue
in U.S. courts and assert antitrust claims under the Sherman Act, which
even included the right to sue for treble damages. 5
7. The term "parens patriae," a Latin phrase literally meaning "parent of his or her country,"
refers traditionally to a doctrine in which a government has standing to prosecute a lawsuit on
behalf of its citizens, especially those persons under a legal disability. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1144 (8th ed. 2004).
8. See J. Gordon Hansen, Current Problems Regarding the Standing of Foreign
Governments in American Courts, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 417 (1964).

9. 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 164, 167 (1870).
10. Id. at 167.
11. Id.

12.
13.
14.
15.

376 U.S. 398 (1964).
Id. at 408-09, 412.
Id. (paraphrasing respondents' argument).
Pfizer, Inc. v. India, 434 U.S. 308, 318 (1978).
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Nevertheless, as noted by the lower court in DeCoster,16 prior to 1999,
case law had only addressed the issue of a foreign country suing to assert
their proprietary interests, that is, economic interests that were the same as
a private litigant would have. 17 No case had apparently ever held that a
foreign nation would be permitted to sue to assert their sovereign interests,
such as a claim to establish borders or to enforce their own laws.'8
DeCoster was remarkably different from either jurisdictional interest,
for it was the first time where a foreign government sued in U.S. courts to
assert not a proprietary, or even a sovereign interest, but instead a quasisovereign interest, to wit, an interest which permitted a government to sue
as parens patriae on behalf of its citizens.' 9 By any measure, immediately
prior to the commencement of the DeCoster litigation in the mid-i 990s,
working and living conditions for workers at the DeCoster Egg Farm in
Turner, Maine were horrific. According to the Sierra Club's "Rap Sheet"
about the farm,2" workers were required to work ten to fifteen hours a day
and had no equipment to protect them from disease.21 The workers were
required to pick up dead chickens with their bare hands and to handle
manure potentially infested with the salmonella virus.22 They lived with
exposure to live electric parts and inoperable smoke alarms.23 Often twelve
people were compelled to live together in one trailer measuring no more
than ten feet by ten feet.24 Overused septic tanks would often fill-up,
causing toilet contents to back up into shower tubs.25 Flushing toilet paper
was not allowed and soiled paper flowed from overfilled waste baskets.26
Workers were unable to adequately clean themselves or their clothes.27
According to a July, 1996 Occupational Safety and Health Agency
(OSHA) media advisory, Labor Secretary Robert Reich labeled these
conditions "as dangerous and oppressive as any sweatshop we have seen,"

16. Estados Unidos Mexicanos v. DeCoster, 59 F. Supp. 2d 120, 122 (1999).
17. Id. at 122.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See DeCoster Egg Farms - Turner, Maine [hereinafter DeCoster Rap Sheet], available
at http://www.sierraclub.org/factoryfarms/rapsheets/maine/decoster.pdf(last visited Mar. 9,2004).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. DeCoster Rap Sheet, supranote 20.
26. Id.
27. Id.
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asserting that "[flear and intimidation kept these workers in this unsafe,
unhealthy atmosphere and living in totally unsanitary conditions."28
These dangerous conditions caused OSHA in the mid 1990s to cite
DeCoster Egg Farm with a variety of health and safety violations with
penalties exceeding $3,650,000.29 Then, in an unprecedented action,
Estados Unidos Mexicanos, the Nation of Mexico, together with certain
named individual migrant workers at the Egg Farm, commenced an action
against the DeCoster corporations (and against Austin DeCoster, its
principal shareholder, as well as successor companies) in U.S. District
Court for the District of Maine. 3' The complaint included claims asserting
violations of the civil rights of the farm workers under 42 U.S.C. § 1981,
as well as claims of unsafe and unsanitary housing under the Migrant and
Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1801.31 As to
the § 1981 civil rights claim, the complaint alleged that workers of
Mexican descent, whether American or Mexican citizens, were treated
harshly because of their Mexican background and that non-Mexican
workers fared better; some of the fourteen individual plaintiffs were
Mexican citizens or nationals and others were American citizens of
Mexican ancestry.32
Mexico appeared in the action alleging that it did so in a "parens
patriae33 capacity, in an effort both "to protect its citizens and [to
advance] its own quasi-sovereign interests. 34 Mexico asserted that its
"quasi-sovereign" claim was rooted in its interest in the general health and
well-being of workers of Mexican descent employed by defendants, rather
that in "its sovereign interest in protecting and maintaining its boundaries
[or in] its proprietary interest in owning land or conducting a business
venture."35 Interestingly, as a preliminary matter, the First Circuit chose
28. Id.
29. Id. Note that according to the Sierra Club, these violations were settled in May 1997
where DeCoster agreed to pay two million dollars in fines and making several improvements in
safety and health over three years. Id. Unfortunately, DeCoster and the successor corporations
which took over operation of the egg farm evidently failed to live up to the 1997 settlement
agreement and further violations were asserted in June 1999, and again in June 2000. Id.
30. Estados Unidos Mexicanos v. DeCoster, 59 F. Supp. 2d 120 (D. Maine, 1999).
31. Estados Unidos Mexicanos v. DeCoster, 229 F. 3d 332, 332 (lst Cir. 2000).
32. DeCoster, 59 F. Supp. at 121.
33. "Parens Patriae" was defined by the circuit court as having its roots in the common law
concept of the royal prerogative; that is, the power of the king as "father of the country" to act as
the guardian for those under disabilities to act for themselves. DeCoster,229 F.3d at 336 n.4 (1st
Cir. 2000).
34. Id. at 335.
35. Id. at 336 n.3.
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not to attempt to distinguish between Mexico's own quasi-sovereign
interest and its derivative stake in the interest of the individuals it
represented;36 the circuit court specifically noted in its decision that it did
not reach the issue of whether Mexico in fact has a quasi-sovereign interest
in the well-being of workers of Mexican descent employed by plaintiff, but
it simply assumed that Mexico had interests apart from those 7of the
individual plaintiffs and was suing as more than a nominal party.1
Mexico's core allegation in support of its standing request was that
since U.S. courts had recognized the ability of individual states within the
United States to sue U.S. individuals or corporations as parenspatriae,
Mexico, by analogy, should be afforded that same right.3" It cited language
in Missouri v. Illinois,39 an early twentieth-century U.S. Supreme Court
case involvingparenspatriaestanding for individual states, to suggest that
the Court had essentially analogized federal nations to individual states in
their ability to proceed in parenspatriae.4 Mexico also heavily relied on
a more recent U.S. Supreme Court case, AlfredL. Snapp and Sons, Inc. v.
Puerto Rico ex. rel. Barez, which granted the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico standing to proceed in parenspatriaeto assert the claims of Puerto
Rican workers against individuals and companies engaged in the apple
industry in Virginia.4 ' That case set forth illegal employment practices
under provisions of the Wagner-Peyser Act42 and the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952. 4"
The U.S. District Court in Maine denied standing to Mexico and the
First Circuit affirmed the decision." The First Circuit based its decision on
a number of grounds.4 5 First, the First Circuit distinguished Snapp on the
fact that Snapp had involved a specific statutory claim under the Wagner36. Id. at 336.
37. Id.
38. DeCoster,229 F.3d at 337.
39. 180 U.S. 208, 219 (1901).
40. DeCoster,229 F.3d at 337.
41. Alfred L. Snapp & Sons, Inc. v. Puerto Rico exrel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 608 (1982).
42. 29 U.S.C. § 49 (2005). The Wagner-Peyser Act, passed in 1933, established the U.S.
Employment Service, which maintains an interstate clearance system used by U.S. employees who
wished to recruit non-local workers; implementing regulations also requires nondiscriminatory
working conditions for both domestic and non-U.S. workers. See id.
43. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2004). The 1952 Act serves to limit the admission of temporary workers
into the United States only if unemployed persons capable of performing such service cannot be
found in this United States. Id.
44. DeCoster, 229 F.3d at 343.
45. Id. at 335-43.
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Peyser Act rather than a § 1981 claim.46 The circuit court stated that it was
debatable whether the Snapp holding would even provide to an individual
state, let alone a foreign government, a claim under § 19814 Snapp, the
circuit court stated, merely involved enforcement of a claim based upon
the Wagner-Peyser Act, which, it held, had assigned a special role to
states. 48 More significantly, the circuit court also flatly held that even if it
could be assumed that an individual state could bring a claim under §
1981, Mexico's claim would fail because, unlike a state, and unlike the
U.S. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, a foreign nation such as Mexico has
"no cognizable interest" within the U.S. system of federalism to bring a
representative claim on behalf of residents within the United States. 49 This
element, the circuit court observed, was "a critical element of parens
patriaestanding."50
The First Circuit also held that the principal of comity offered no
additional support to Mexico's position." While Sabbatino held comity
would allow a foreign nation to assert its own proprietary interests in U.S.
courts,52 in DeCoster,the circuit court observed thatparenspatriae"goes
beyond normal standing requirements," and the standing request was
therefore not entitled to the deference that comity would ordinarily allow.53
The circuit court also cited a policy consideration which it suggested
counseled against foreign nation parens patriae standing. 4 It held that,
"since the foreign affairs [of the United States] was committed to the
executive and to the Congress," granting Mexico standing to assertparens
patriaeclaims in U. S. courts could have the undesirable effect of usurping
the executive's treaty-making prerogative and its role as the single entity
which is to negotiate with foreign nations. 5 The circuit court theorized that
the ability of these branches to negotiate agreements, which provided for
reciprocal protection of American interests, might be compromised if
standing were conferred.56 The circuit court also disposed of Mexico's
argument that courts were already precluded by both the act of state and
political question doctrines from embarking into political waters and thus
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 336.
Id. at 339.
Id.
DeCoster,229 F.3d at 339-40.
Id. at 339.
Id.
Id.at 339-40.
Id. at 340.
DeCoster,229 F.3d at 340.
Id.
Id.
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would be prohibited from straying into improper areas. 7 This view by
Mexico, the circuit court held, was logically undermined by recent
pronouncements of the U.S. Supreme Court in which the Court had
underscored that the act of state doctrine reflected the "strong sense" of the
judicial branch not to engage in activities which could hinder the
executive's independent authority over foreign affairs, which, if anything
"work[ed] against" Mexico's position."
Other policy grounds asserted by the circuit court as justification for its
decision included the concept that a class action, rather than a claim
brought under the authority ofparenspatriaestanding, was the preferred
vehicle for pursuing claims on behalf of a country's citizens.5 9 It also held
that the potential for conflict existed between the individual plaintiffs and
a parens patriae nation plaintiff over issues of settlement, appropriate
relief, and the like, which also counseled againstparenspatriaestanding. °
Finally, in a sidebar that many commentators have criticized as
disingenuous,61 the circuit court suggested that should Mexico desire to
continue to pursue its concerns, it could do so through the dispute
resolution system established by the NAALC,62 the side agreement to
NAFTA, if not through the formal dispute resolution methods, at least
through the prescribed process of ministerial consultations.63
As will be more fully discussed in Parts III and IV herein, this decision
has remained controversial, with debate centering not only on the decision
itself, but also on whether or not a more appropriate remedy to address
these issues is in fact found in the NAALC, a treaty ostensibly created by,
among others, the United States and Mexico, to specifically address labor
concerns of the type complained of in DeCoster.
III. ARGUMENTS

IN FAVOR OF AND AGAINST STANDING

Analysis of whether or not foreign country parenspatriae standing
should be allowed can be categorized as follows: 1) that prior U.S.
precedent either compels or prohibits a finding of standing; and 2) that

57. Id.
58. Id. at 340; see also id. at 340 n.1 1 (discussing W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., Inc. v. Envtl.
Tectonics Corp., Int'l, 493 U.S. 400, 404 (1990)).
59. DeCoster,229 F.3d at 340-41.
60. Id. at 340.
61. Id. at 341.
62. See NAALC, supra note 5 and accompanying text.
63. DeCoster,229 F.3d at 342 n.15.
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other legal or societal considerations otherwise weigh for or against
standing. Each argument will be address below.
A. Precedentand the RequiredNexus of Federalism
In DeCoster,Mexico claimed that precedent should have compelled a
finding of standing. 64 Its argument first centered on the single statement in
Missouri v. Illinois,65 one of the early cases involving parens patriae
standing for individual states within the United States, to establish the
proposition that the Court essentially equated together a state and a foreign
nation as possessing the same rights on behalf of its citizens, with each
thus being equally empowered to act in parens patriae on behalf of those
citizens.66 The quoted language of the Missouri court set forth by Mexico
in DeCoster was as follows:
If Missouri were an independent and sovereign State all must admit
that she could seek a remedy by negotiation, and that failing, by
force. Diplomatic powers and the right to make war having been
surrendered to the general government, it was to be expected that
upon the latter would be devolved the duty of providing a remedy.
[We think is found in the constitutional provisions we are
considering.]67
Mexico also asserted that the Court's decision in Snapp, that Puerto
Rico had parens patriae standing to assert claims under the WagnerPeyser Act and the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 on behalf of
Puerto Rican citizens in Virginia against a Virginia apple grower,
demonstrated that the right to assert parens patriae standing was not
restricted to states.68
Figueroa has claimed that the holding in DeCoster,that the presence
of individual states within the U.S. federalism system was a critical
component to the right of states to assert parens patriaestanding, was
based on an overly restrictive view of the early cases which first
recognized the parens patriae right of states. 69 Figueroa observed that
64. Id. at 337.
65. 180 U.S. 208 (1901).
66. DeCoster, 229 F.3d at 337.
67. Id. (quoting Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 241 (1901)).
68. Alfred L. Snapp & Sons, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 608 (1982).
69. Kenneth Juan Figueroa, Immigrants and the Civil Rights Regime: Parens Patriae
Standing,ForeignGovernments and ProtectionfromPrivateDiscrimination,102 COLUM. L. REV.
408, 452-63 (2002).
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these early cases centered more importantly on the question of whether a
cognizable "quasi-sovereign" interest was truly set forth by a state. 70 Any
concomitant discussion of the state's presence with the U.S. federalism
system within these cases was merely a reference to the original
jurisdiction of federal courts concerning actions between states, rather than
being a true restriction on the parenspatriaedoctrine.7
Figueroa also claimed that two relatively recent cases supported to
foreign nation parens patriae standing. 72 He asserted that Pfizer, Inc. v.
Lord,73 an Eighth Circuit decision involving U.S. antitrust claims
concerning antibiotic purchases by certain foreign governments, supports
foreign nationparenspatriaestanding because the court's decision, while
seemingly restricting its analysis to the more traditional proprietary
interests of these countries as purchasers, had not "rule[d] out" the
possibility of a foreign country suing as parens patriae. ' 74 He also found
support for foreign nationparenspatriaestanding inInre Union Carbide
Corp,"7 where the district court dismissed the parens patriaeclaim of
India on forum non conveniens grounds.76 According to Figueroa, this
holding indirectly confirmed that parenspatriae standing was generally
available to a foreign country because "a ruling on forum non conveniens
generally presumes that standing in the ruling court has already been
established. 77
Critical analysis of the extensive case law on state parens patriae
standing, however, lends no support to the view that parens patriae
standing should be given to foreign nations, and may be more accurately
construed, as it was in DeCoster, to demonstrate that, if anything,
precedent requires that standing should not be granted.78
First, Mexico did not specifically identify any case to the DeCoster
court which squarely recognized a right of parens patraie standing for a
foreign nation, nor does independent research identify such a case.
Moreover, each case cited either by Mexico or by commentators arguing
in favor of such standing is either easily distinguishable on its facts or has
70. Id. at 453-57.
71. Id. at 453.
72. Id.at 442-43.
73. 522 F.2d 612 (8th Cir. 1975).
74. Figueroa, supranote 69, at 442.
75. 634 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
76. Figueroa, supra note 69, at 443.
77. Id. (citing Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 502, 507 (1947) and its general statement
that the doctrine of forum non conveniens "presupposes at least two forums in which the defendant
is amenable to process.").
78. Estados Unidos Mexicanos v. DeCoster, 229 F.3d 332, 337 (lst Cir. 2000).
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been read in a hyper-technical fashion with an eye toward sustaining the
hoped-for position. For example, as claimed by Mexico, the first sentence
of the quoted language in the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Missouri
v. Illinois79 does indeed initially compare states with foreign nations in a
superficial and allegorical reference to the powers of a sovereign authority.
However, the very next sentence of Missouritakes away what is seemingly
granted; it states:
Diplomatic powers and the right to make war having been
surrendered to the general government, it was to be expected that
upon the latter would be devolved the duty of providing a remedy
[to proceed in parens patriae on behalf of a state's citizens] and that
remedy, we think, is found in the constitutional provisions we are
considering. 0
The Court therefore found parens patriae authority on behalf of a state
because that state had surrendered its separate status to become part of the
federal system in which it now sued for relief; according to the Court, a
state, even after its merger into the U.S. federal system, still enjoyed
residual sovereign rights which allow it to sue on behalf of its local
citizens."' In other words, the Court foundparenspatriaestanding because
a state was a part of the federal system. If anything, this demonstrates that
parenspatriaestanding should not be available to a foreign nation.
A review of Snapp also reveals that parens patriae standing was
conferred upon the government of Puerto Rico precisely because of the
fact that, even though it is not a state, it is a Commonwealth of the United
States, and thus a part of the U.S. federal system. 2 Significantly, the
Snapp court specifically noted in its decision that Puerto Rico had
specifically pled in its complaint that the claimed "discrimination against
Puerto Rican farmworkers deprived 'the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
of its right to effectively participate in the benefits of the Federal
Employment Service System of which it is a part."' 3 The Court also
explicitly noted that Puerto Rico participates directly in the operation of
the federal employment scheme as part of its express holding that standing
should be conferred. 4
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

180 U.S. 208, 241 (1901).
Id.
See id.
Alfred L. Snapp & Sons, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592,608-10 (1982).
Id. at 598.
Id.at 609-10.
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Other cases support the First Circuit's observation that the presence of
a state within the general federal system within the United States is critical
to a finding ofparenspatriaestanding. As aforesaid, Missouriv. Illinois,
by virtue of its explicit reference to the relationship between an individual
state and the federal government, directly based its decision to grant a state
parenspatriae standing on the fact that each state is part of the federal
system." In Georgiav. Tennessee Copper Co.,86 the U.S. Supreme Court
made clear that the right of the state to claim parenspatriae was based
upon the federalist notion that a state, by their union with the United
States, did not agree to submit in all instances to whatever might be done
by the nation as a whole.8 7 According to the Court, a state retained "still
remaining quasi-sovereign interests" and the ability to prosecute them in
federal courts.88
Moreover, as specifically noted in DeCoster, the very fact that
principals of federalism underlie the ability of a state to proceed inparens
patriae is confirmed by the coordinate case law which holds no such
standing may be permitted against the federal government itself (as
opposed to individual private persons or entities), at least where "the suit
seeks to enforce its citizens' rights 'in respect of their relationship with the
federal government' where it is the United States, and not the State that
represents them as parens patriae."89 In other words, the separate residual
sovereign nature of the individual state is effectively trumped where the
federal sovereign is the defendant under the U.S. federalism system of
governance established by the U.S. Constitution, because as to an
individual state, the federal entity has subsumed the right of that individual
state to sue to protect the personal rights of its citizens.
Figueroa's argument that the discussion in these early cases of
federalism concerns has been misunderstood, and were actually references
to original jurisdiction issues is belied not only by the fact that some of
these cases were brought by a state against individual defendants, rather
than another state (cases where the issue of original jurisdiction is clearly
irrelevant),9" but also by the application of pure legal analysis. Clearly, the
extensive discussion in these early cases regarding "quasi-sovereign"
85. Missouri, 180 U.S. at 241.
86. 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
87. Id. at 237.
88. Id.; see also Georgia v. Pa. R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 439 (1945); Washington v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 406 U.S. 109 (1972).
89. Estados Unidos Mexicanos v. DeCoster, 229 F.3d 332, 338 n.7 (lst Circ. 2000).
90. 7enn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. at 236-37; see also Pa.R.R. Co., 324 U.S. at 446-47; Gen.
Motors Corp., 406 U.S. at 111.
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interest and whether a particular governmental entity may assert the right
to sue on behalf of citizens is, in reality, an attempt to grapple with the
issues of conflicting government power and authority within a complex,
interrelated federalist system. It relates directly to the essential question of
which of these overlapping governmental entities within this system has
the right to assert such claims - not where the lawsuit must be filed. The
original jurisdiction argument is thus, in all respects, fatally flawed.
Close analysis also reveals that neither Pfizer nor Union Carbideadds
any real support to the view in favor of foreign nation parens patriae
standing. The holding in Pfizer clearly related to its affirmative finding
that no parenspatriae interest was being asserted by the foreign nations
because no quasi-sovereign interest was being asserted, only proprietary
interests, in the antitrust claim. 9' Issues relevant toparenspatriaestanding
were thus completely irrelevant in Pfizer, and the court did not even
discuss it in any substantive way. So, too, in Union Carbide, the case
clearly pertained to the issue of forum non-conveniens, and its holding had
no relevance whatsoever to the doctrine of foreign parens patriae
standing. 92 Moreover, if the doctrine of forum non-conveniens presupposes
anything, it is not, as some commentators would have it, whether a
plaintiff has standing in each forum, but rather whether a defendant is
amenable to jurisdiction in both jurisdictions (here the United States and
India).93 In any event, as with Pfizer, there is no indication that the Union
Carbide court reviewed the foreign nation parenspatriaeconcept in any
meaningful way or meant to signal any particular view on that doctrine.
Thus, not only is parens patriae standing for foreign nations not
required by prior precedent, such precedent may be read to stand for the
opposite conclusion - thatparenspatriaestanding for a foreign country,
in the absence of a nexus with the federal system, should not be allowed.
B. Other Legal and Policy Considerations
Mexico and others have asserted that, in addition to the issue of
whether precedent mandates foreign country parens patriae standing,
several policy considerations which are claimed to support standing.94
91. Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 522 F.2d 612, 617 (8th Cir. 1975).
92. In re Union Carbide Corp., 634 F. Supp. 842, 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
93. See Figueroa, supra note 69, at 443 n.184. Compare id. at 443 (stating "Significantly,
however, a ruling on forum non convenience generally presumes that standing in the ruling court
has already been established" with the cases actuallycited), with Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S.
501,507 (1947) (holding that forum non conveniens presupposes only that "defendant is amenable
to process" in both jurisdictions).
94. See Figueroa, supra note 69, at 422-27.
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These include: the premise that allowing a foreign country standing would
assist in empowering oppressed individuals who may themselves be
unfamiliar with U.S. laws, suspicious of U.S. institutions like the judiciary
or otherwise unable (or at least hesitant) to seek redress for civil rights
violations; a belief that allowing standing would even the playing field and
provide assistance to individual plaintiffs with the substantial legal costs
associated with successfully prosecuting these claims; and finally, an
argument that allowing standing would supplant or replace the inadequate
assistance (overwhelmed or unavailable legal aid mechanisms,
understaffed federal or state civil rights agencies, etc.) to which an
individual plaintiffs might otherwise turn to vindicate their rights.9 5
On the other hand, DeCosterspecifically addressed matters of policy
and held that countervailing policy considerations weighed against
standing. These considerations include: the potential for different interests
between the individual plaintiff and the parenspatriaenation over issues
such as settlement or appropriate relief; and a belief that allowing foreign
nation parenspatriaestanding might serve to undermine the interests of
the individual plaintiffs by overwhelming and effectively subsuming the
individual interests of the plaintiff with the larger needs of the foreign
nation.96
Unquestionably, citizens of Mexican descent have been discriminated
against in the United States. It is also without doubt that many of these
individuals must be considered to be a vulnerable population, suffering
from a lack of resources, language difficulties and a natural reluctance to
confront U.S. institutions of which they may be suspicious. Moreover,
while the United States has an extensive network of federal, state and local
government agencies which have the capacity to engage in substantive
activity against malfeasants such as the owners of the DeCoster Farm (and
as aforesaid OSHA has in fact taken extensive steps to attempt to remedy
conditions there), government resources are unquestionably finite and
more could have been done by the U.S. government to assist these
individuals.97 But, as the Eighth Circuit noted, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, through its provisions concerning the granting of class action
status, serves to provide the government of Mexico, should it choose to do
so, with the ability to effectively advance the interests of these individuals
95. Id.
96. Estados Unidos Mexicanos v. DeCoster, 229 F.3d 332, 340-41 (lst Cir. 2000).
97. In that regard, the First Circuit decision itselfpointedly referenced observations made by
amicus Farmworker Justice Fund regarding decreased efforts by federal agencies charged with
enforcing wage and hour laws in agriculture. Id. at 342.
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in the same manner as if it was to proceed by means ofparenspatriae.9
It could select willing representative individuals to act as lead plaintiffs
(much like the nineteen individuals who actually were selected by Mexico
to act as co-plaintiffs in the DeCosterlitigation) and, rather than seeking
to assert its own quasi-sovereign position on behalf of its people, instead
finance the efforts of the lead plaintiffs to themselves seek to be certified
as class representative to assert the interests of similarly situated
individuals. It does appear that the social concerns that Mexico claims
would be ameliorated by parens patriae standing (lack of resources,
language difficulties, reluctance to confront U.S. institutions) are also
effectively addressed through the use of a class action actively financed by
the Mexican government. While in DeCoster, class action status was
ultimately denied,99 this appears more to be due to the fact that, as is
common with any lawsuit involving a large class of plaintiff, it is difficult
to adjudicate individual damage claims, with injunctive relief often being
the only practical alternative."3 Clearly, any court would face the same
problems in attempting to find an appropriate way to award individual
damages to an individually aggrieved individual in either a class action or
a parens patriae lawsuit, and thus parens patriae standing offers no
particular advantage over class action status.
The remaining question to be addressed in this Article is whether or not
the NAALC, the heavily-negotiated side agreement to NAFTA signed by,
among others, Mexico and the United States, may serve to fill the
perceived gap in justice of which Mexico complains. As will more fully
appear in Part IV, the answer to that question may serve to reveal the true
positions of both the United States and Mexico to matters involving the
internal labor matters of each.

98. Id. at 340.
99. See Ramirez v. DeCoster, 194 F.R.D. 348, 353 (2000). The district court, finding that the
request for class action status was simply "unmanageable" as a result of the way that plaintiffs had
insisted in pleading their case. Specifically, the plaintiffs had insisted on pressing individual
damage claims for over one thousand individuals, some of whom may have worked at different
times, for different durations, at different plants, over a span of six to seven years; the plaintiffs also
refused to limit their claims to common patterns or practices of discrimination, thus, in the eyes of
a court, making the joint handling of such diverse claims simply impossible.
100. See, e.g., Cason v. Nissan Motor Acceptance Corp., 212 F.R.D. 518 (M.D. Tenn. 2002)
(refusing to certify a class based upon the disparate nature of the damage claims, the Cason court
agreed to certify for class action status claims for injunctive and declaratory relief, for those claims
that would not require individualized determinations).
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IV. DOES NAALC AFFORD AN EQUIVALENT REMEDY?

In its denial of Mexico's request for parenspatriaestanding, the First
Circuit in DeCoster clearly hinted that a more appropriate avenue for this
sort of dispute existed under the terms of the NAALC, the labor side
agreement to NAFTA.' ' The defendants in DeCoster had taken the
position that, since the primary responsibility for resolving labor disputes
between countries rested with the executive and Congress because of their
primary authority over treaty-making, the NAALC must be deemed to be
a determination of the U.S. Executive that disputes of this nature were not
to be heard by the courts but were instead to be exclusively governed by
the NAALC dispute resolution process.'l 2 While the First Circuit did not
explicitly adopt this reasoning, it did note what it termed the "important
point" that there was no suggestion in the express terms of either NAFTA
or NAALC that the executive or Congress specifically intended to grant
any party to that agreement special standing as parens patriaeto pursue
claims of this nature.' 3 The circuit court also pointedly suggested that
Mexico had the option to either demand arbitration under the NAALC, or
ministerial consultation under that treaty to address the
at least, request
situation."°
Yet, in fact, the NAALC does not provide an effective equivalent
remedy to Mexico in this situation. First, plain review of the treaty's
dispute resolution mechanism shows that it does not authorize claims
against individual defendants, but instead confines itself to claims against
' Moreover, remedies under the treaty
the member countries themselves. 05
are plainly not intended to be for the specific benefit of individuals but are
instead directed at causing the signatory nation to take certain remedial
actions to address the problem, with trade sanctions against the signatory
nation the result if the terms of the treaty are violated; these remedies
include a recommendation from a panel established to review the dispute
for a "mutually satisfactory resolution" to remedy and resolve the problem,
with fines and then trade sanctions resulting if the panel's
recommendations are not adhered to.0 6
Moreover, the text of the NAALC, at article 42, specifically states that
nothing within the treaty is intended to empower one party's country to
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

DeCoster,229 F.3d at 341-42.
Id. at 342.
Id.
Id. at342n.15.
See NAALC, supra note 5, art. 27.
Id.
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undertake labor law enforcement activities within the territory of another
country.'l 7 This clause therefore confirms that, if anything, it is the clear
intent of NAALC, and the signatory nation which negotiated it, not to
allow one country to intervene inparenspatriaein the court system of the
others.
It is also noteworthy (and probably emblematic of the inherent
limitation of the scope of the NAALC) that, as the DeCoster court was
undoubtably aware, complaints regarding worker conditions at the
DeCoster Farm had actually been submitted for resolution under the
NAALC dispute resolution mechanism, with at best inconclusive results.'08
In August of 1998, over two years before the October 2000 First Circuit
deuision in DeCoster, the Confederation of Mexican Laborers filed a
complaint with the Mexican National Administrative Office (NAO)
regarding the deplorable working conditions on the DeCoster Farm. 0 9 It
took over fifteen months for the matter to work its way to the point where
the Mexican Labor Minister requested ministerial consultations with the
U.S. Labor Secretary regarding the matter."0 These consultations
ultimately resulted in an agreement signed by Mexico, the United States,
and Canada; the agreement, however, only, served to establish a series of
meetings to discuss the matter, and ultimately, in 2001, a public forum
sponsored by the U.S. NAO under the title "Promoting Dialogue Among
Migrant Agricultural Workers, Growers and Government Officials."''. The
agreement also required that the Secretariat of the Commission for Labor
Cooperation (the standing tribunal established by NAALC to administer
the treaty) develop a "tri-national" set of voluntary guidelines on migrant
workers." 2 In other words, the formal dispute resolution established by
NAALC has taken over five years to address the conditions on the
DeCoster Farm and this effort has resulted in an astonishingly meager
result of a few meetings, a public forum and a set of voluntary guidelines.
The question, of course, raised by this disappointing result is whether
the dispute resolution mechanism established by NAALC can be viewed
in any realistic way as an effective tool to resolve serious labor violations
107. See id.art. 42.
108. See Mark J. Russo, NAALC: A Tex-Mex Requiem for LaborProtection, 34 U. MIAMI
INTER-AM. L. REV. 51, 53 (2002).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.; Commission for Labor Cooperation, The Rights of Nonstandard Workers: A North
American Guide (addressing migrant worker issues), availableathttp://www.naalc.org/english/pdg
studyl.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2005).
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within the boundaries of its signatory countries. According to Human
Rights Watch, as of the date of this writing, only twenty-three cases have
been filed under its dispute resolution provisions by nongovernmental
organizations seeking relief in the ten years that the treaty has been in
existence.' 13 Moreover, according to that organization, the treaty has been
largely ineffective; its harshly critical findings include the following: that
the signatory countries have barely used the power conferred by the treaty;
that even when a serious problem has been identified, such concerns have
been essentially unaddressed by the signatory countries; "some case
reports have been devoid of findings of fact; interpretation of the
NAALC's obligations has been minimal; and agreements between
governments to address concerns arising in NAALC cases have, by design,
provided little or no possibility of resolving the problems identified by
petitioner."" 4
Thus, review not only of the NAALC treaty itself, but of the history of
the implementation of that treaty by the signatory parties, demonstrates
that the parties to the NAALC have shown a pronounced reluctance to
allow the other party to directly intervene into their own internal labor
matters. Perhaps one may also conclude that in actuality NAALC
represents a common agreement on this subject by all signatories - that
each party wanted the other parties to stay out of their internal labor
matters.
The DeCoster decision, it seems, may thus be completely consistent
with the positions of the parties as expressed by the NAALC, and the
DeCostercourt correctly, albeit indirectly, confirmed this when it held, in
essence, that allowing Mexico to intervene and assert parens patriae
standing would create an inconsistency with the area already addressed in
negotiations by the executive and the Congress concerning foreign affairs
- in effect a determination that the U.S. Executive and Congress had
already addressed, and already resolved, the issue in the NAALC treaty
with Mexico. Perhaps in the final analysis, the First Circuit had it right
after all.

113. Joel Solomon, Trading Away Rights The Unfulfilled Promise of NAFTA 's Labor Side
Agreement, Apr. 2001, Vol. 13, No. 2(B), at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/nafta/ (last visited
Mar. 9, 2004).
114. See id.
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V. CONCLUSION

This Article has shown that existing precedent demonstrates that
foreign nation parens patriae standing should not be granted because,
unlike an individual state within the United States, a foreign nation plays
no role in the federalism system established by the U.S. Constitution, and
is therefore unable to assert a quasi-sovereign interest on behalf of
individuals residing within the boundaries of the United States.
This Article has also demonstrated that while there are substantial
policy interests in providing assistance to protect the needs of the migrant
worker of Mexican origin, foreign nationparenspatriae
standing is not the
only available method that can be employed to serve this interest, and that
other methods, notably a properly pled class action lawsuit, remains a
viable option that offers equivalent protection. It has also been shown that,
as the First Circuit observed in DeCoster, there exists countervailing
policy considerations which weigh against foreign nation parenspatriae
standing, including a concern that allowing foreign nation parenspatriae
standing within the U.S. court system might impinge upon, or conflict
with, the power and authority of coordinate branches of the federal
government over foreign affairs and, in effect, allow Mexico to assert
through litigation, claims and positions that should best be resolved by the
political process.
Finally, it has also been demonstrated that, notwithstanding its salutary
goals, the NAALC provides a wholly inadequate remedy for the resolution
of individual claims of unfair and unsafe labor conditions as was present
in the DeCoster situation. Ironically, however, this very finding might
actually be the intended result of the NAALC. The signatory parties have
clearly, in both explicit and implicit ways, provided in the NAALC that
each party desired independent authority over internal labor matters within
their own borders and consequently denied any authority over such
internal matters to the others. Mexico's doomed efforts in DeCoster, to
obtain its own seat at the plaintiffs litigation table, in essence, was an
attempt to obtain a right it, and the other signatory parties, negotiated away
at the NAALC bargaining table.
Thus, Mexico's attempt in DeCoster to obtain standing on behalf of
this vulnerable population, however salutary on its face, created an
irreconcilable conflict with the clear intent of the NAALC, and was, in
reality, an attempt by Mexico to evade its own bargained-for position. For
that reason, the First Circuit's decision in DeCosterwas correctly decided.
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